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Critical Discussions
TED COHEN ON SHARING THE WORLD
by Michael Fischer
In “Stanley Cavell and the Limits of Appreciation,” Ted Cohen restates his hatred of Richard Wagner’s music. Cohen hears some-
thing “very nasty” in Wagner’s music, “an element of Nazism,” to borrow 
Thomas Mann’s phrase for what Mann, too, found disturbing in Wagner.1 
Whereas Mann was still able to value Wagner’s music, Cohen despises 
listening to it. Cohen realizes that his revulsion sets him apart not only 
from Mann but also from W. H. Auden, who praised Wagner’s “consum-
mate skill” in creating heroes and heroines who exhibit the irrationality 
and self-destructiveness of human nature “in all its formidable enchant-
ment.”2 Cohen notes how another eminent listener, Arturo Toscanini, 
also thought Wagner’s music worth performing, not repulsive.
Faced with conflicting judgments of an artist or work of art, some 
critics have tried to defuse the disagreement by adopting a live-and-let-
live approach, aligning aesthetic judgments with critics’ unimpeachable 
personal preferences. According to this familiar approach, there is no 
disputing taste in art, but there is no need to. Absent any pressure to 
achieve consensus, let alone unanimity, we can agree to disagree about 
art without any harm. Different opinions of a work of art can coexist 
peacefully, side by side, neither threatening nor contesting one another, 
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like the frankly subjective reviews of restaurants, products, and resorts 
aggregated by various websites.
Another, more sophisticated, way of dealing with aesthetic disagree-
ment has been to intervene, not by picking one point of view and 
arguing for its superiority but by pruning discordant judgments of the 
underlying external interests assumed to be producing conflict. This 
response recalls Immanuel Kant, who claimed critics can speak with a 
universal voice and expect assent from others, but only by keeping their 
judgments of art disinterested and purely aesthetic. From this point 
of view, in the dispute over Wagner, Cohen’s invoking “an element of 
Nazism” illustrates the discord that can break out when controversial 
political and ethical considerations disrupt the discussion of art. Tarring 
Wagner’s music with Nazism becomes inflammatory, prejudicial, and out 
of order. I can imagine a Kantian mediator of this debate trying to reset 
it by urging the disputants to refocus their comments on aesthetic issues. 
The hope would be that factoring out irrelevant, incendiary political 
concerns might calm the discussion and reduce the unnecessary tension 
sparked by mixing art and politics.
Contemplating his strong disagreement with prominent advocates 
for Wagner, Cohen doesn’t take either one of these tacks. He neither 
opts for a let-a-thousand-flowers-bloom relativism nor does he recant his 
invocation of Nazism. Cohen accepts the legitimacy of different perspec-
tives on Wagner (his own very much included) but he does not leave 
it at that. He feels he must somehow incorporate into his own outlook 
the fact that others disagree with him; they should do the same with his 
antipathy toward Wagner. Here is Cohen’s striking conclusion:
My claim is that the Wagnerite is perfectly legitimate in his enjoyment 
of this music, and in his capacity to overlook the anti-Semitism in the 
operas, but that he is no more legitimate than I in my disgust. My world 
is one in which the music of Wagner is distasteful. Your world is one in 
which the music of Wagner is endlessly engaging. I have to find room in 
my world for you and your Wagner along with me and my Wagner. If I 
don’t, then I forfeit my claim to human, moral responsibility, for it comes 
with an obligation not to write you off, not to consign you to some other 
world I have nothing to do with. It has to mean something in my world 
that you are in it loving Wagner, for after all, the world is no more mine 
than yours. (p. 158)
For Cohen, at stake in this disagreement over Wagner is nothing less 
than our capacity to live together and share the world with one another, 
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fully aware of our differences. Drawing on Stanley Cavell, Cohen goes on 
to note that our willingness to share the world with others is registered 
by our willingness to engage in conversation with them, conversation 
being “a way—perhaps the way—in which people simply are with one 
another” (p. 158).
I want here to applaud Cohen’s response to aesthetic disagreement 
and the moral pressure he puts on himself to share the world with oth-
ers who differ from him. That pressure comes from what Cohen sees 
as his obligation not to write others off, not to shut them out of his 
world, only because they disagree with him. “For after all,” he says in 
a comment worth repeating, “the world is no more mine than yours.” 
My deep appreciation for this conclusion is tied to my conviction that 
it is vital to democracy, especially now, when we face the resurgence of 
a politics defined by writing some people off, expelling them, silenc-
ing them, or otherwise keeping them from making a difference in the 
world—an autocratic politics, in short, bent on owning, not sharing, the 
world, on fencing it off and having it all to oneself on one’s own terms.
Without mentioning democracy, Cohen hints at the connection I’m 
making between sharing the world and democratic politics when in the 
final section of his essay he turns to some lessons learned from game 
playing. He credits his brother Stephen with the insight that sore losers 
“never seem to feel that you’ve won” (p. 162): “They feel that they’ve 
lost, and would have won if only they had played their best, or the 
sun hadn’t been blinding, or the umpire had been accurate, or what-
ever. Thus they depreciate you and your victory” (pp. 162–63). In the 
antidemocratic politics that rejects sharing the world with others, sore 
losing often means depreciating the opposition party and their victory, 
say, by contesting the opposition’s legitimacy and questioning their very 
right to play the political game. This questioning can take many forms, 
including groundless allegations of fraudulent voting, dark insinuations 
about rigged elections, angry complaints about biased court decisions, 
and lies about a victorious opponent’s qualifications—anything to sow 
distrust in an unwelcome outcome. These tactics fly in the face of what 
Cohen calls (thinking of game playing) “the need to live with them even 
through winning and losing” (p. 163).
In my view, “the need to live with them even through winning and 
losing” is also crucial to democracy, as Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt 
point out in their important book How Democracies Die, one of several 
recent books expressing concern for the future of American democracy.3 
Levitsky and Ziblatt offer several key indicators of authoritarian behavior 
in leaders, including:
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Lack of commitment to the democratic rules of the game. “Do [these 
leaders] attempt to undermine the legitimacy of elections, for example, 
by refusing to accept credible electoral results?” (HDD, p. 23)
Denial of the legitimacy of political opponents. “Do they baselessly 
describe their partisan rivals as criminals, whose supposed violation of 
the law [or potential to do so] disqualifies them from full participation 
in the political arena?” (p. 23)
Toleration or encouragement of violence. “Have they tacitly endorsed 
violence by their supporters by refusing to unambiguously condemn it 
and punish it?” (p. 24)
Readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents, including media. “Have 
they threatened to take legal or other punitive action against critics in 
rival parties, civil society, or the media?” (p. 24)
These specific actions undermine what Levitsky and Ziblatt identify 
as two essential cultural norms or “soft guardrails” (HDD, p. 101) 
underwriting a healthy democracy: mutual tolerance and forbearance. 
Mutual tolerance mitigates against sore losing by honoring the need 
to live with one’s political opponents even when they come out ahead: 
the need to acknowledge one’s opponents as legitimate participants in 
the political process entitled to win, not treasonous foes or intolerable 
threats. Forbearance counteracts ungracious winning by honoring the 
need to live with one’s opponents even after defeating them. Winners 
of elections exemplify forbearance when, out of respect for an ongo-
ing relationship with the other side, they are generous, not vindictive. 
They refrain from seizing on their current electoral ascendancy as an 
opportunity for total, permanent control, or a long-sought-after chance 
to squelch their political rivals once and for all. Mutual tolerance and 
forbearance combine to fortify the central social vision of democracies 
that I think Cohen’s conclusion reinforces: individuals and groups shar-
ing the world with people who differ from them, creating that world 
together, talking with them, and benefiting from relationships that 
encourage disagreement, independent thinking, and dissent.
Cohen’s conclusion grows out of his response to a disagreement over 
Wagner, which may at first glance restrict its transferability to politics, 
where much more seems to be at stake. As if responding to this cau-
tion, Cohen goes on to consider another kind of conflict that matters 
to him: disagreement with someone over abortion. This disagreement 
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is potentially harder to stomach and on the face of it more applicable 
to the acrimonious world of actual politics. Cohen is pro-choice, a 
position that he knows others passionately reject. He realizes that the 
abortion debate, in contrast to an aesthetic disagreement, has “to play 
out differently, because now it is not merely a matter of acknowledging 
the legitimacy of one another’s feelings, because something will have to be 
done” (p. 160): laws have to be voted on, court rulings issued, funding 
decisions determined. But after acknowledging this difference between 
debating abortion and a work of art, Cohen refuses to let it nullify the 
conclusion he arrives at when faced with opposition to his dislike of 
Wagner:
But something has to be done [in the debate over abortion], and what 
the pro-choicers want done is not what the pro-lifers want done. It is one 
thing for you to enjoy Wagner’s music while I avoid it, and for both of us 
to credit one another with humanity and dignity, and quite another for 
us to engage in this mutual acceptance when something has been done 
that the other despises. And yet, surely, this is exactly what has to be done 
unless our conversation is to end and we are to be resigned, truly, to be 
in a war of all against all. This is not an easy thing to do (it is not really 
all that easy for the Wagner-lovers and Wagner-haters to share a musical 
world), and I do not know that it is possible to do it. I do know that it has 
to be attempted, and that forsaking the attempt is no less than forsaking 
the idea that we might live together. (p. 160)
Even when something has to be done and people differ strongly about 
what course of action to take, as in the debate over abortion, the underly-
ing challenge for Cohen remains the same: “What are we to do to remain 
together when we cannot agree?” (p. 159). His answer: try to summon 
up the level of mutual acceptance that will allow us to continue to talk 
to one another despite our deep differences.
Far from depending on agreement, the mutual acceptance Cohen 
is affirming embraces conflict. Cohen is aligning social cohesion with 
aesthetic disagreement, not fandom or people forming communities 
that crystallize around their shared enthusiasm for a book or artist. As 
Cohen puts it, “We cannot take agreement as the only sign this apprecia-
tion [of one another] has been achieved” (p. 162). Cohen isn’t letting 
go of his previous views or converting to an outlook he once dissented 
from, in effect accepting self-censorship or hypocrisy as the price for 
coexisting with others. That is the price exacted by autocratic leaders 
who want to control the world, not share it: hence their penchant for 
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extortion, loyalty tests, you’re-either-with-me-or-against-me ultimatums, 
and other forms of coercion. That is a price Cohen refuses to pay. Instead 
of abandoning his convictions, Cohen opts for continuing to express 
them in exchanges with the pro-lifers and Wagnerites he disagrees with. 
Conversation is his alternative to the war of all against all, the otherwise 
unceasing power struggle that makes recourse to force inevitable.
A better word for conversation here might be quarreling. I take the 
term from Linda M. G. Zerilli, who finds Kant using “quarreling” in his 
Critique of Judgment to characterize what aesthetic disagreement sounds 
like, or, in more Kantian language, how participants in aesthetic disputes 
uphold different positions while claiming the right “to pronounce val-
idly for everyone” without, however, invoking determinate concepts or 
unassailable rules.4 “Quarreling” maps out a middle ground between a 
no-holds-barred brawl, to be settled only by force, on the one hand, and, 
at the other extreme, a dispute that potentially lends itself to objective 
resolution, say, by appealing to agreed-upon standards and facts or by 
deferring to broadly accepted authorities. Quarreling redeems disagree-
ment, stays patient with it, and resists peremptory moves to cut short 
the conversation, whether by force or fiat.
Quarreling takes on political dimension when, in A Democratic Theory 
of Judgment, Zerilli, like Cohen, persuasively contends that arguing over 
aesthetic judgments has much in common with contesting political 
opinions. Participating in a democracy entails individuals figuring out, 
sharing, defending, and sometimes revising their responses to the many 
issues that come their way. Declaring “this war should not be fought” or 
“this legislation is unfair” resembles asserting “this painting is beautiful” 
or “this music is unbearable.” In both aesthetic and political debates, 
quarreling captures how a high level of disagreement over specific 
conclusions can coexist with an ongoing relationship between the very 
people who oppose one another. As Zerilli suggests, whether they are 
wrangling over art or politics, disputants keep talking to one another, 
not because they agree on everything but because they rely on shared 
patterns of support in advocating for their divergent positions.5 These 
patterns of support are directive and accommodating, evidence providing 
yet open-ended; they shore up a particular position while respecting the 
freedom of others to reach a different conclusion. More specifically, a 
participant in an aesthetic or political debate is always soliciting, urging, 
and hoping for agreement from others without, however, presuming 
to demand it. Inviting assent (as opposed to compelling it) takes many 
forms, including asking others to clarify the criteria they are using to 
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reach their conclusions and inviting others to try to see for themselves 
what you see in a painting or proposal. As an example, consider Cohen 
inviting other listeners to hear something “very nasty” in Wagner’s music 
while exploring with them why they either do not hear it or, hearing it, 
why they minimize the damage Cohen is sure it does to Wagner’s music.
Here, then, is how I view the relationship I see Cohen aspiring to 
have with the Wagner enthusiasts and pro-life advocates he disagrees 
with: an unending quarrel punctuated by moments of convergence 
and separation, mutual attunement and incomprehension, hope for 
consensus and frustration, a quarrel sustained by the noncoercive pat-
terns of support both sides adduce to back up their divergent positions. 
Whatever outcomes result from this exchange, Zerilli reminds us that 
one is especially important to democracy. By sharing the world and 
talking to one another in this way, we are also creating our world as a 
place where we can live with disagreement and resist taking arms against 
one another because we differ. Cohen reinforces this insight by showing 
how disagreement can become a sign of caring, of showing others that 
their opinions matter enough for us to keep talking with them, thus 
reaffirming that “the world is no more mine than yours.”
There remains the serious problem of imperious people who feel they 
own the world and resist sharing it, who refuse to reciprocate Cohen’s 
large-mindedness and make room for his anti-Wagner or pro-choice views 
in their lives. Instead of inviting assent to their various positions, these 
people demand it. They resort to force and reject the right of others, 
Cohen included, to have a voice in how they say things are going to be. 
As we have seen, among the many varieties of authoritarianism seeking 
to control the world on their own terms, one kind—Nazism—makes an 
early appearance in Cohen’s essay as “an element” in Wagner’s music 
that for Cohen discredits it. But Nazism, it’s worth emphasizing, also 
exists in less rarefied or attenuated forms, not only as the hard-to-
make-out undercurrent of a complex piece of music but as unabashed, 
Jews-will-not-replace-us hatred, violence, and anger. The threat posed 
by this virulent form of Nazism prompts Cohen to acknowledge, “Of 
course, one can go too far with this thought”—“this thought” being 
his own stated desire to share the world with people he disagrees with. 
Cohen goes on to write, “Suppose my opponent is someone who wishes 
to enact laws that would disenfranchise Jews, or maybe even kill them. 
What can it mean to share my world with that person? Am I required 
to appreciate him, and let it go at that?” (p. 162).
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Cohen finds a parallel in his aesthetic experience even for the urgent 
questions raised by the threat of Nazism. He admits,
I can find a place in my world for those who love Wagner, and I expect 
them to find a place in their worlds for me and my distaste for Wagner. 
But it is much harder for me to locate someone who finds Beethoven 
disagreeable. In fact I find it easier to keep company with someone who 
likes no music at all than with someone who loves some music but can’t 
stand Beethoven. (p. 162)
This comment risks trivializing Nazism by equating it with someone 
disliking Beethoven. But Cohen is not saying that taste in music has the 
same horrific consequences as an abhorrent political movement. He is 
saying that for himself, that is, for someone who takes music seriously, 
disliking Beethoven raises the same question as vicious anti-Semitism, 
namely, how can I “keep company” with someone so far removed from 
my own values? This question begets another: “how far is too far?” Cohen 
concludes, “There is no rule for this, but it isn’t bad to deal with these 
monstrosities as they come up, sizing up their monstrousness and seeing 
whether one can live with them” (p. 162).
I think this is wise advice. Cohen calls not for abandoning judgment 
but continuing to exercise it, “sizing up” the monstrosities that inevitably 
surface in one’s world and calibrating the appropriate response to them, 
presumably in conversations with others. Our response to the monsters 
troubling our world can include deciding we cannot live with them and 
we must do whatever we can to nullify their destructive influence. In 
Thinking of Others: On the Talent for Metaphor Cohen reaffirms how the 
imperative to appreciate or credit others even when they disagree with 
us does not amount to giving them a blank check. It is always possible 
in a conflict to discover “at the last stage, that there is nothing attrac-
tive to appreciate [in an opponent]. There is nothing there besides 
ignorance, stupidity, or delusion. We cannot—should not—always give 
in.”6 But even in these extreme cases, Cohen adds, “It is good to identify 
the exact deficiency, and, perhaps, even to imagine what it is like to be 
afflicted with it” (TO, p. 81). The imperative to understand others, not 
automatically to write them off, is that strong.
As I have been arguing, that imperative shines through Cohen’s essay 
and shapes his response to the people he clashes with, whether they 
disrupt his world by loving Wagner, favoring bans on abortion, or by tak-
ing other positions that provoke him.7 Cohen defends the imperative to 
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understand others by contrasting it to the incessant fighting that befalls 
us if we quit trying to appreciate people whose views differ from our 
own. More positively, Cohen suggests that aesthetic experience itself can 
play a constructive role in motivating and equipping us to understand 
others. He rounds out his essay on the limits of appreciation by asking:
What does it mean to appreciate someone else, and, in particular, someone 
whose feelings are different? For a while I have been developing the thesis 
that the ability to imagine oneself to be another is an absolute prerequisite 
for the competent appreciation of much narrative art, and maybe other 
art as well. It seems to me often required that one somehow put oneself 
in touch with the feelings, say, of characters in a novel or movie, and that 
one does this, if one can, by achieving a kind of imaginative identifica-
tion with that character. It may also be required that one do this with an 
artist, say a poet, in order to gain a robust sense of how things seem to 
that person. (p. 161)
Cohen expands on the connection he makes between “the ability to fully 
appreciate narrative fiction and the ability to participate in the morality 
of life”: both, he argues, depend on “the ability to imagine oneself to 
be someone else” (TO, p. 73). Cohen is not saying that engaging with 
narrative fiction and other forms of art pays off in immediate, auto-
matic moral attentiveness. Instead, I hear him suggesting that the moral 
influence of literature and the arts is indirect, gradual, and cumulative, 
more like the benefits of everyday physical exercise than dramatic, life-
transforming surgery. As Elaine Scarry has said along similar lines, “It’s 
not that I read [a work of literature] and then go out and care about 
more people.” Nevertheless, by fostering “a greater pliancy of thinking, 
a greater openness to the concerns of others,” literature and the other 
arts can strengthen our willingness to let others count in our lives.8
By tying our engagement with the arts, especially narrative art, to our 
capacity for appreciating how someone else feels, Cohen’s argument 
comes full circle. The very arts that inspire disagreement provide us 
with the resources for dealing with it. This is another conclusion that 
speaks to our stewardship of democracy. I value how recent writing on 
the challenges facing American democracy has renewed appreciation 
for the cultural influences and “soft guardrails,” to repeat a phrase 
from How Democracies Die, necessary to sustain democratic values.9 
This expansive understanding of democracy—as depending on more 
than elections, laws, institutions, and constitutions—recalls Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, where he famously called attention 
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to the “habits of the heart” citizens must cultivate for democracy to take 
root and flourish. According to Tocqueville, citizens develop—or fail 
to develop—these habits of the heart in everyday interactions with one 
another: in neighborhoods, workplaces, schools, volunteer organizations, 
and other places where they gather every day.10 Danielle Allen extends 
this crucial line of thought when she calls for cultivating “practices of 
political friendship” in Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship since 
“Brown v. Board of Education.” Allen reminds us,
Trust is not something that politicians alone can create. It grows only 
among citizens as they rub shoulders in daily life—in supermarkets, at 
movie theaters, on buses, at amusement parks, and in airports—and 
wherever they participate in maintaining an institution, whether a school, 
a church, or a business. How can we successfully generate trust in these 
contexts?11
To fortify democracy, all individuals have a responsibility to nurture 
mutual respect in the many contexts where they interact.
Cohen deserves immense credit for identifying the social reception 
of the arts as an important context in which we can develop democratic 
responses to conflict.12 As I have shown, he starts out with a specific 
aesthetic disagreement, then uses it to explore how we might be able to 
share the world with the people who differ from us. By staying open to 
other points of view, Cohen keeps alive forms of interaction that offset 
the endless zero-sum vying for personal advantage that would otherwise 
consume even more of our lives—the war of all against all that auto-
cratic leaders thrive on. Here is one more reason for valuing Cohen’s 
work and the engagement with the arts he so passionately championed.
Trinity University
1. Ted Cohen, “Stanley Cavell and the Limits of Appreciation,” in The Claim to Community: 
Essays on Stanley Cavell and Political Philosophy, ed. Andrew Norris (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006), p. 157; hereafter cited by page number.
2. W. H. Auden, “The Greatest of Monsters,” reprinted in Auden, Forewords and Afterwords, 
ed. Edward Mendelson (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 255; quoted in Cohen, 
“Stanley Cavell and the Limits of Appreciation,” p. 157.
198 Philosophy and Literature
3. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Crown, 2018); 
hereafter abbreviated HDD.
4. See Linda M. G. Zerilli, A Democratic Theory of Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2016), p. 55; hereafter abbreviated DTJ. Here is the passage in Critique of Judgment 
cited by Zerilli: “’There is no disputing about taste’ is as much as to say that the determin-
ing ground of a judgment of taste may even be objective, but it cannot be brought to 
determinate concepts; consequently nothing can be decided about the judgment itself by 
means of proofs, although it is certainly possible and right to argue [mit Recht gestritten 
werden kann; straiten, to quarrel] about it” (section 56). Zerilli goes on to defend the 
value of quarreling even in the absence of determinate concepts and standards of proof.
5. Zerilli takes the phrase “patterns of support” from the work of Stanley Cavell. See 
DTJ, pp. 17–18, 54–55, 66–67, 77.
6. Ted Cohen, Thinking of Others: On the Talent for Metaphor (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), pp. 80–81; hereafter abbreviated TO.
7. In Thinking of Others Cohen adds to the list of people he disagrees with mystics, 
spiritualists, and “vulgar Freudians,” joined by certain literary theorists whose expositions 
of “theory” strike him as “at best mostly vacuous and partly banal, at worst mostly mean-
ingless and partly false,” despite being cast “in terms of excruciating difficulty” (p. 81).
8. Elaine Scarry, “Poetry, Injury, and the Ethics of Reading,” in The Humanities in Public 
Life, ed. Peter Brooks with Hilary Jewett (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 
pp. 67, 69.
9. See, for example, Eric Klinenberg, Palaces for the People: How Social Infrastructure Can 
Help Fight Inequality, Polarization, and the Decline of Civic Life (New York: Crown, 2018). 
Sites that can nurture democratic patterns of social interaction include coffee shops, 
public pools, public libraries, and playgrounds, where unsupervised play by children 
can teach them how to resolve conflicts on their own. See Jonathan Haidt and Greg 
Lukianoff, “How to Play Our Way to a Better Democracy,” New York Times, September 1, 
2018. Several influential books and articles by Robert Putnam similarly emphasize the 
importance to democracy of everyday interactions developing social trust among citizens. 
See especially Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), and Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: 
The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).
10. See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Phillips Bradley, trans. Henry 
Reeve, vol. 1 (New York, Knopf Doubleday, 1954), ch. 17.
11. Danielle S. Allen, Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship since “Brown v. Board of 
Education” (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 48.
12. In Empathy and the Novel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Suzanne Klein 
also values discussions of literature in book clubs, classes, and other settings that build on 
solitary reading. For Klein, the full impact of fiction “arises from circumstances during 
which teaching or active discussion accompanies reading” (p. 147): “without passion-
ate teachers (parents, librarians, and other book lovers), even classics remain inert” 
(p. 146). In support of this view, Klein cites one book whose very title resonates with 
Cohen’s argument: Wayne C. Booth, The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988).
